The 60-second version of Vipul Limited — what it does, how it earns, and who it competes with, before any of the numbers below.
Nothing stands out as clearly deteriorating on the years of data available.
| Metric | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | 3Y CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ₹138 Cr | ₹75 Cr | ₹206 Cr | ₹87 Cr | -14.3% |
| EBITDA | -₹11 Cr | ₹26 Cr | ₹308 Cr | -₹1 Cr | — |
| EBITDA Margin | -7.7% | 34.1% | 149.2% | -1.3% | — |
| PAT (Net Profit) | -₹42 Cr | -₹93 Cr | ₹234 Cr | -₹28 Cr | — |
| EPS | ₹-3.49 | ₹-9.78 | ₹19.46 | ₹-2.01 | — |
| ROE | -18.1% | -80.9% | 66.4% | -7.5% | — |
| ROCE | -5.6% | -35.7% | 84.6% | -1.4% | — |
| Total Debt | ₹603 Cr | ₹278 Cr | ₹188 Cr | ₹106 Cr | -44.0% |
| Free Cash Flow | ₹17 Cr | ₹420 Cr | -₹114 Cr | ₹42 Cr | +34.1% |
| Company | P/E | ROE |
|---|---|---|
| DLF LIMITED | 36.6x | 10.3% |
| GODREJ PROPERTIES LTD | 30.2x | 8.4% |
| OBEROI REALTY LIMITED | 23.5x | 14.7% |
Poor scores on business quality without a price low enough to compensate. There is no obvious argument for owning this over a stronger company at a similar valuation. 2 high-severity red flags sit above this conclusion and should be read first.